No. 2017 IL App (1st) 142733 People
v. Williams Filed 8-28-17 (TJJ)
The defendant-appellant, Torolan Williams (hereinafter “defendant”), was charged with five counts of first degree murder and one count of armed robbery. During the ensuing trial, the State used historical cell phone site data and defendant’s own statement that he was a lookout to implicate him in the crimes. After hearing all the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison for the five murders and 20 years in prison for the armed robbery. Defendant raises several issues on appeal. Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements that he acted as a lookout because they were the product of coercion, (2) the trial court erred in admitting the historical cell phone site records into evidence, (3) the State improperly presented evidence concerning possible sentencing, (4) the State violated a pretrial ruling concerning the use of the historical cell phone site records, and (5) he suffered prejudice when the trial court referred to three of the verdict forms as “guilty forms." Based on the record before this court, the trial court did not err in admitting the historical cell site records or incriminating statements, and defendant was not denied a fair trial.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160025 People
v. Brown Filed 8-25-17 (TJJ)
Defendant George Brown was charged with aggravated battery to a police officer. After a bench trial, defendant was acquitted of committing that offense, but found guilty of resisting a police officer as a lesser-included offense. Newly discovered evidence caused the trial court to vacate the conviction for resisting a police officer and order a new trial on the resisting charge only. This time, defendant opted for a jury trial and was found guilty again for resisting a police officer. Defendant raises a number of issues on appeal. We find that there was no violation of defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy and that the resolution of the issues in his second trial was not precluded by collateral estoppel. We also find that the trial court did not err when it
denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest. We do, however, find that defendant should have been recharged and that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court refused to give a jury instruction that was amply supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160723 In
re Estate of Jagodowski Filed 8-25-17 (TJJ)
This appeal presents two certified questions that arise from a dispute over the estate of Krzysztof Jagodowski, a/k/a Christopher Jagodowski, who died intestate on January 23, 2016. Boguslaw Malara, the administrator of Christopher’s estate, moved to establish heirship by arguing that Joanna Ungstad was not Christopher’s biological daughter. The trial court denied his motion, finding that Boguslaw lacked standing to challenge Christopher’s parentage and that the challenge was otherwise time-barred. Thereafter, the trial court certified two questions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). The first question asks us to determine whether the limitations periods under the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015 (Parentage Act) (750 ILCS 46/205 (West Supp. 2015)) apply in a probate proceeding, and the second asks whether the administrator of an estate has standing to maintain a proceeding to adjudicate the nonexistence of a parent-child relationship. We answer the first question in the affirmative, concluding that the Parentage Act applies to a parentage challenge in a probate proceeding. We decline to answer the second question and instead reverse the trial court order’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161384 Parsons
v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company Filed
Plaintiff-appellee Michael Parsons was employed by defendant-appellant Norfolk Southern Railway Company as a railroad conductor since September 2010. Plaintiff was injured at defendant’s railyard on September 2, 2011, when his left foot was crushed between the railcar he was riding and a car that he had recently left on an adjacent track. Plaintiff sued defendant for negligence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). On April 21, 2016, the trial court denied the relief sought in defendant’s post-trial motion, except that it ordered a $1 million remittur from the jury’s $1.5 million award for lost earnings. Plaintiff accepted the remittitur on May 4, 2016. On that date, the court entered a corresponding order, reducing the amount of plaintiff’s judgment by $1 million, to $21,474,102. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on May 19, 2016. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152658 Developers
Surety & Indemnity Co. v. Lipinski Filed
Developers Surety and Indemnity Company (DSI) filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Marc S. Lipinski. After years of litigation, DSI admitted that insurance had compensated it for all losses it suffered due to the alleged malpractice. DSI argued that under the collateral source rule, Lipinski should not benefit from DSI’s insurance, so the insurance should not affect the award of damages. DSI admitted that it owed to its insurers all damages it recovered from Lipinski. The trial court held that the collateral source rule did not apply in legal malpractice actions. Because DSI could not prove any damages from the alleged malpractice, the court dismissed the complaint. In this appeal, we hold that section 2-403 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-403 (West 2012)) required DSI to name its insurers, the real parties in interest, as plaintiffs. Because the plaintiffs violated section 2-403, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160999 Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 241 v. Illinois Labor Relations
Board, Local Panel Filed 8-21-17 (TJJ)
The Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241 (Union), brought an unfair labor practice charge against the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) for violating the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and failing to bargain with the Union when the CTA implemented an open fare payment collection system, known as Ventra. The Ventra contract resulted in the CTA eliminating Union positions and subcontracting what had been Union jobs to a private company. The Illinois Labor Relations Board (Board) dismissed the unfair labor practice complaint as it pertained to the subcontracting of Union jobs as untimely because the charge was not filed within six months of the date that the Union received a copy of a request for proposals (RFP) for Ventra from the CTA. The Board then dismissed the rest of the complaint because it determined that the elimination of Union positions was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Union appealed the Board’s decision to this court directly. In our original decision, issued on March 27, 2017, we rejected the Board’s finding that the subcontracting charge was untimely. We held that the Union’s charge as to subcontracting was timely filed and remanded to the Board for further consideration of the merits of that charge, as well as reconsideration of the charge on the elimination of Union positions. On August 9, 2017, we granted petitions for rehearing filed by the CTA and the Board. On reconsideration of the issues in this case, we realize that our initial decision overlooked the possibility that the Union’s charge on subcontracting may have been untimely, even though the RFP did not trigger the time to file a charge. We now remand to the Board to further consider the timeliness of that claim and for other consideration as outlined in this opinion.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160604 In
re Carol B. Filed 8-24-17 (TJJ)
In July 2016, after a hearing on the State’s petitions for involuntary admission and the administration of involuntary treatment, the trial court found the State violated section 2107(a) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-107(a) (West 2016)) by administering psychotropic medication to respondent without her consent when there was no threat of serious and imminent physical harm. However, the court found the violation to be harmless and subsequently granted both orders for a period not to exceed 90 days. ¶ 3 Respondent appeals, asserting (1) the State’s violation of section 2-107 of the Code resulted in a deprivation of her rights that requires reversal and (2) her psychiatrist failed to provide her with written documentation of the risks, benefits, side effects, and alternatives of treatment—as required by section 2-107.1 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West 2016))—until four days after he began administering medication, which requires reversal of the court’s order for involuntary treatment. For the following reasons, we reverse.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 150219 People
v. Merritt Filed 8-23-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Phillip T. Merritt, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition filed under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2014)) in connection with his convictions of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2008)). He contends that he stated sufficient claims that he was denied due process when the trial court denied his motion for a continuance after he was allowed to proceed to trial pro se and that the court failed to find that consecutive sentences were necessary for the protection of the public. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150215 People
v. Pulido Filed 8-16-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Javier Pulido, appeals his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence recovered from a search of his vehicle. We reverse.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160378 C.H.
v. Pla-Fit Franchise, LLC Filed 8-23-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiffs C.H. and Kelly Otterness were secretly videotaped in Planet Fitness’s tanning rooms. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint against defendants Pla-Fit Franchise, LLC, and PF East Moline, LLC, alleging defendants’ failure to ensure members’ privacy in the tanning rooms caused plaintiffs’ severe emotional distress. Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint, and the trial court granted the motions, determining plaintiffs had no cause of action for emotional distress damages. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that (1) defendants are liable in negligence for the criminal or tortious acts committed by a third party, and (2) defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in violation of section 2 of the Premises Liability Act (740 ILCS 130/2 (West 2014)). We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150373 People v. Garry Filed 08-22-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160977
v. Ramsey Filed 08-22-17 (MGB)
After a bench trial,
defendant Cedrick Ramsey was convicted of three counts
of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to
natural life in prison. He raises three issues on
appeal: (i) whether the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence recovered during a
warrantless search of his residence after police arrived
in response to a 911 call, when the items were in plain
view, were not taken by police during the initial
search, and were later recovered by an evidence
technician; (ii) whether the admission of other crimes
evidence was an abuse of discretion; and (iii) whether
his trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no error or
other basis for reversal, we affirm. the emergency aid
exception justified the warrantless entry of Ramsey’s
residence, the search of the residence to locate other
potential victims or offenders and the seizure of the
evidence in plain view reasonably associated with
Ramsey’s assault of F.S.. The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing S.S. to testify to Ramsey’s
assault on her. Both cases share several similarities,
including Ramsey using an alias on a chat line,
initiating consensual sex with young women, bringing
them to his home, threatening them with a knife, forcing
them to engage in sex, and tying them up.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143637 People
v. Bridgeforth Filed 08-22-17
Following a bench trial,
defendant Idris Bridgeforth was convicted of one count
of criminal sexual assault, two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual abuse, and one count of indecent
solicitation of a child based on his contact with J.E.,
a student at the school where defendant was a sports
coach. Defendant was sentenced to 10 years in prison for
those offenses. On appeal, defendant contends this case
should be remanded for additional inquiry, pursuant to
People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), into his
claim that his trial attorney should have presented
records of physical therapy sessions and coaching
timesheets to show that defendant was elsewhere
during the time of the described encounters. Court
correctly concluded that counsel's alleged failure to
introduce Defendant's physical therapy and employment
records. Where sexual conduct was alleged to have
occurred during unspecified dates over the course of
several months, and the records showed he could not have
been present over just some portion of the time frame,
the introduction of those records would not have
undermined State's case, particularly where Defendant
admitted to being in presence of alleged victim when he
gave her rides home after track practice during relevant
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162551 Nicholson v. Shapiro & Associates, LLC Filed 8-18-2017 (ATH)
Court answers two certified questions posed by the court. (1) “Under Illinois law, does the doctrine of in pari delicto bar a court-appointed [Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)] receiver from bringing suit on behalf of a company against the company’s outside auditor for allegedly failing to discover the fraud and/or illegal acts of the company’s sole owner?” and (2) “Under Illinois law, does the departure of the fraudulent actor prevent the application of the in pari delicto defense to a court-appointed SEC receiver’s claim against the company’s outside auditor?” The certified questions arise out of an action commenced by plaintiff-appellee, Jill Nicholson, solely in her capacity as court-appointed receiver of Illinois Stock Transfer Company, against defendant-appellant, Shapiro & Associates (Shapiro).
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 140432 People v. Goodwin Filed 8-17-2017 (ATH)
The defendant, Bonita D. Goodwin, appeals her conviction, following a trial by jury in the circuit court of Shelby County, for the offense of threatening a public official, contending that the State failed to adduce adequate evidence, as required by the applicable statute, that the officer was a public official. We agree.
Plaintiffs, Jane Doe, Jane A. Doe, and John Doe, brought claims against several individuals and entities that were part of the United Church of Christ (UCC). The claims were based on the sexual misconduct of Chad Coe during his tenure as youth pastor at the First Congregational Church of Dundee, Illinois (FCC), a congregation within the UCC. Plaintiffs alleged that Coe groomed Jane Doe, a minor and member of the FCC’s youth group, and eventually had sex with her on FCC’s property. The trial court dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs’ claims against defendants which alleged that defendants were negligent in the hiring, supervision, and retention of Coe.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160909 Vanguard
Energy Services, L.L.C. v. Shihadeh
Filed 8-16-17 (MGB)
Defendant and Gas Company agreed in February 2014 that Company would provide 25% of natural gas needs at a fixed price, which agreement was confirmed by email without objection in June, 2014. Later in June, 2014, the Parties agreed that Company would provide an additional 50%of gas needs for Defendant, which was not confirmed in any manner. Defendant terminated agreement. Company sued on both agreements. Trial Court granted 2-619 Motion to Dismiss on grounds that the Statute of Frauds required the contracts, valued in excess of $500.00, to be in writing. In defining the term merchant, the legislature intended that the knowledge or skill of the purchaser is specifically related to the “knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction.” Here, the transaction involved the purchase of natural gas to heat defendant’s building. Plaintiff makes no allegation that defendant has any knowledge or skill specifically related to the natural gas industry. Had the legislature intended to include all business persons in this exception, as the UCC comment intimates, it certainly could have said as much. Natural gas is in essence, fungible, and does not meet the specially manufactured test so as to avoid the Statute of Frauds. Based on the preceding, the judgment of the trial court granting defendant’s section 2- 619(a)(7) motion to dismiss counts I and II of plaintiff’s amended complaint is affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143562 People
v. Evans Filed 8-15-17 (TJJ)
Angelo Evans, who was given a 90-year prison sentence as a juvenile, is receiving day-for-day credit against his sentence and may serve only 45 years of imprisonment. Evans wants to take advantage of recent United States Supreme Court opinions holding that a juvenile’s youth and immaturity must be taken into account before he or she is sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He attempted to file a successive petition for postconviction relief, but the trial court denied him permission. We agree with the trial court. Evans is not serving either a life sentence or a “de facto” life sentence without the possibility of parole, and the recent eighth amendment decisions do not apply to him.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161862 In
re Marriage of Benjamin Filed 8-15-17 (TJJ)
The marriage of the parties, respondent Arlene Benjamin and petitioner Laurence Benjamin, was dissolved in a judgment for dissolution of marriage on December 4, 2001. On January 4, 2006, respondent filed a petition for indirect civil contempt alleging that petitioner had failed to make his required maintenance payments. In January 2009, the parties entered into an agreed modification of judgment wherein petitioner agreed to make several payments totaling $500,000 in maintenance. On December 3, 2013, petitioner filed a petition pursuant to section 2- 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)) to vacate the agreed order of January 2009 based on a claim that he was fraudulently induced into the agreement. After discovery and a hearing, the Cook County circuit court denied the section 2-1401 petition. In a later hearing, the trial court found petitioner in indirect civil contempt for failing to make the final payment pursuant to the January 2009 agreement. The trial court also awarded respondent her attorney fees and denied petitioner’s request for sanctions. On appeal, petitioner alleges several errors by the trial court: (1) the trial court erred in denying his section 2-1401 petition because respondent fraudulently concealed her assets and income; (2) the trial court erred in holding him in indirect civil contempt because he acted in good faith; (3) the trial court should not have awarded respondent attorney fees, or, in the alternative, should have reduced them to a reasonable amount; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied his request to sanction respondent for filing a false affidavit. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders in all respects.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 163284 Pekin
Insurance Company v. Lexington Station, LLC
Filed 8-15-17 (TJJ)
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by plaintiff Pekin Insurance Company, seeking a declaration that it owes defendant Lexington Station, LLC, no duty to defend in a personal injury lawsuit filed by Marcos Botello against Lexington. Pekin issued a commercial general liability (CGL) policy to ACC, Inc. Defendant Marcos Botello was injured during the effective policy period, while working as an employee of ACC, on a development project owned by Lexington. Mr. Botello filed a personal injury lawsuit against Lexington. Lexington tendered defense of that action to Pekin. Pekin refused the tender, then filed this action, arguing it had no duty to defend Lexington as an additional insured under the policy issued to ACC. On appeal, Pekin argues that the court’s entry of judgment in favor of Lexington and Westfield was in error because (1) Mr. Botello’s complaint did not contain allegations that created a potential for a claim of vicarious liability against Lexington and (2) the circuit court improperly considered a third-party complaint in coming to its conclusion. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 121156-C People
v. Downs Filed 8-15-17 (TJJ)
Accordingly, pursuant to our supreme court’s supervisory order, we vacate our judgment in Downs IV, 2016 IL App (2d) 121156-B, and return to the procedural position following Downs III’s reversal and remand directing us to consider defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of Krankel counsel; this time, however, we have the benefit of our supreme court’s decision in Cherry. In this appeal, we will consider defendant’s challenge to the conduct of Krankel counsel at the second Krankel hearing. Defendant argues that Krankel counsel was ineffective because he abdicated his role to represent defendant when he abandoned defendant’s specific claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We reverse and remand the cause.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160231 State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Welborne
Filed 8-15-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm), as subrogee of Timothy W. Schreiber, brought a small claims case in Tazewell County circuit court against defendant, William Welbourne, doing business as Welbourne Builders, Inc., for negligent roof repair. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of State Farm on its negligence claim. Welbourne filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. Welbourne appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150651 In
re Estate of Lee Filed 8-14-17 (TJJ)
In a probate proceeding, the beneficiaries of a testamentary trust sought to have the trustee, Kathleen Line, provide an accounting of the trust; to have the executor of the decedent’s estate, Jennifer Mansberger, pay certain sums directly to the beneficiaries, rather than to the trust; to hold Kathleen in contempt for failing to provide an accounting; and to remove Kathleen as the trustee of the trust. After hearings, the Kankakee County circuit court granted all of the beneficiaries’ requests. Kathleen appeals and challenges those rulings. We affirm all of the orders in question, except for the contempt order, as to which we reverse, vacate the sanction imposed, and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162149 Madden
v. Scott Filed 8-11-17 (TJJ)
The defendants and counterplaintiffs, Thomas R. Scott and Sylvie Scott, (hereinafter referred to as the Scotts), appeal from orders of the trial court: (1) granting both an implied easement and an easement by prescription over a portion of a condominium unit owned by them for purposes of ingress to, and egress from, an adjoining condominium unit; (2) granting an injunction, permanently enjoining them and the subsequent owners of their condominium unit from, inter alia, interfering with, or obstructing, the use of the easement by the owners of the adjoining condominium unit; (3) directing them to remove certain specified personal property from the easement and enjoining them from placing those or similar items in the easement; (4) directing that the sliding glass door which allows access to the easement from the outside remain unlocked until the door is rekeyed and the owners of the adjoining unit are given duplicate keys to the lock; (5) providing that the court’s orders shall run with the land; and (6) denying their motion to remove a cloud on the title to their condominium unit. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the orders of the trial court.
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 160189 People
v. Brindley Filed 8-11-17 (TJJ)
The defendant, James W. Brindley, was charged with one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of real property used for religious worship and one count of unlawful drug conspiracy. The defendant filed a motion to suppress a video and audio recording of an alleged drug transaction that the State obtained without judicial authorization. The State maintained that the recording was admissible under section 14-3(q)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/14-3(q)(1) (West 2012)). The circuit court disagreed, granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, and barred the State from presenting the audio/video recording. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), the State seeks an
interlocutory review of the circuit court’s order. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150079 People
v. Maya Filed 8-10-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Erick Maya, appeals following his convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). He argues that the circuit court abused its discretion both by admitting certain evidence of defendant’s prior bad acts and by failing to provide the jury with an instruction limiting the use of such evidence. Alternatively, defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request that jury instruction. As a separate argument, defendant contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that the transcript of certain Facebook messages qualified for the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. Finally, defendant argues that the circuit court failed to conduct a satisfactory inquiry under People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), after defendant made pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject defendant’s evidentiary claims as well as the related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, we remand the matter so the circuit court may make a proper preliminary inquiry into those separate, pro se claims of ineffectiveness raised by defendant at the posttrial stage.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160885 In re Marriage of Sorokin Filed 8-9-2017 (ATH)
Petitioner, Natasha Sorokin, appeals a post-dissolution order granting the petition of respondent, Aron Sorokin, to modify his child-support obligation. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150383 People v. Truesdell Filed 8-9-2017 (ATH)
The defendant appeals from the first-stage dismissal of his pro se postconviction petition. He argues that the imposition of certain fines, as well as the calculation of sentence credit attendant to his underlying conviction were erroneous.
3. Criminal: Affirmed: The order of protection entered against Racy impacted the children’s custody and continues to affect it during the pendency of the order of protection. Therefore, we find that section 606(e) of the Marriage Act is the applicable statute and that the trial court did not err when it found the Marriage Act applied to the admission of hearsay statements. The Marriage Act provides that a child’s hearsay statement about abuse is admissible in a hearing regarding either custody or visitation. O’Brien, J.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160379 Countryman v. Racy Filed 8-9-2017 (ATH)
Petitioner Travas Countryman sought an order of protection against respondent Norman Racy, the stepfather of Countryman’s three daughters. In the petition, Countryman alleged that Racy physically and sexually abused the then seven and four year old girls. Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court entered the plenary order. Racy appealed. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 160274 Cheng v. Ford Filed 8-9-2017 (ATH)
The plaintiffs, Drs. Qiang Cheng and Jale Tezcan, associate professors at Southern Illinois University Carbondale (SIUC), brought this complaint seeking, inter alia, money damages for alleged tortious interference by defendant Dr. Susan M. Ford, SIUC’s interim provost and vice chancellor of academic affairs. Dr. Ford filed a motion to dismiss the claim against her under section 2-619 arguing that, under the State Lawsuit Immunity Act she is a State employee immune from suit in circuit court and that, under the Court of Claims Act the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ tort claim seeking money damages. The circuit court disagreed and denied Dr.Ford’s motion to dismiss but granted her motion to certify questions for interlocutory appeal. The court certified two questions – whether Dr. Ford is entitled to sovereign immunity from the tort claim seeking money damages pursuant to the Illinois State Lawsuit Immunity Act when Plaintiffs have alleged that Dr. Ford acted in excess of the express language of the University Policy and that such conduct injured Plaintiffs, and whether such claim must be filed, if at all, in the Illinois Court of Claims pursuant to the Illinois Court of Claims Act.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162459 Country
Club Estates Condominium Association v. Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC Filed 8-8-17 (TJJ)
Defendant Bayview Loan Servicing purchased a condominium unit through a foreclosure sale confirmed in November 2014. At the time of the sale, the unit had accrued nearly $14,000 in unpaid monthly assessments to plaintiff Country Club Estates Condominium Association. But seven months after its purchase, despite a demand from the Association, Bayview refused to pay any assessments, past or present. Nearly two months after the lawsuit was filed, and seven months after Bayview acquired
the unit, Bayview tendered to the Association a payment of $4,771.85, which represented only the assessments that accrued after the foreclosure sale. Bayview then moved for summary judgment, arguing that under section 9(g)(3) of the Condominium Property Act (Act) (765 ILCS 605/9(g)(3) (West 2014)), its tender of assessments accruing after the foreclosure sale extinguished the Association’s lien for assessments that accrued before the foreclosure sale. The trial court agreed and granted partial summary judgment to Bayview as to the presale assessments. We reverse and hold that, in order to extinguish presale assessments under section 9(g)(3), a foreclosure buyer must make prompt payment of assessments after acquiring the property. Summary judgment for Bayview was improper because a material question of fact exists as to whether Bayview’s tender, seven months after acquiring the unit, can be considered prompt. We therefore remand for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 150156 People
v. Ramirez-Lucas Filed 8-8-17 (TJJ)
Following a jury trial, the defendant, David Ramirez-Lucas, was convicted of first-degree felony murder in connection with the deaths of two men at a Rockford bar. He was sentenced to natural life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this court affirmed those convictions and the sentence. See People v. Ramirez-Lucas, 2013 IL App (2d) 110940-U. The defendant thereafter filed a postconviction petition, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present three occurrence witnesses whose testimony would have corroborated his self-defense theory. The trial court dismissed the defendant’s petition as frivolous and patently without merit. We reverse and remand for additional proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160161 People
v. Threatte Filed 8-8-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Michael Threatte, was charged with domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12- 3.2(a)(1) (West 2014)). In the middle of his jury trial, the prosecutor became ill and the trial court declared a mistrial. Defendant moved to bar reprosecution, on double- jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appeals, contending that no manifest necessity existed to declare a mistrial, as other prosecutors were available to take over the case. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160565 People
v. Zendejas Filed 8-8-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Ruben Zendejas, appeals the denial of his motion to reconsider his sentence of 10 years’ incarceration after he pleaded guilty to aggravated driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6), (d)(1)(C) (West 2014)). Defendant was sentenced on May 27, 2016, and he moved to reconsider on June 10, 2016. On June 24, 2016, defendant’s counsel filed an amended motion to reconsider and a certificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Defendant contends that his sentence was excessive. The State, however, observes that a remand might be required because the certificate did not strictly comply with Rule 604(d). We agree.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160348 Performance
Food Group v. ARBA Care Center of Bloomington, LLC
Filed 8-8-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Performance Food Group, brought suit against the ARBA and ASTA defendants listed in the caption above for breach of contract, seeking to collect money that plaintiff was allegedly owed for food products that it had sold and delivered to defendants to be used in defendants’ nursing home facilities.1 During pretrial proceedings, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted after a hearing. Defendants appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160683 In
re Commitment of Vance Filed 8-8-17 (TJJ)
Respondent, James Vance, appeals from the trial court’s order, finding that probable cause did not exist to warrant an evidentiary hearing to determine if respondent was no longer a sexually violent person. On appeal, respondent argues that the court erred in granting the State's motion for a finding of no probable cause. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160687 Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. v. American Senior Benefits LLC
Filed 8-7-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff Bankers Life and Casualty Company (“Bankers Life”) appeals a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Gregory P. Gelineau in a breach of a noncompetition agreement. On appeal, Bankers Life argues that 1) several issues of material fact precluded a summary judgment disposition and 2) the circuit court abused its discretion when denying Bankers Life’s request for additional discovery. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161465 Motorola
Solutions v. Zurich Insurance Co. Filed 8-4-17
The instant appeal arises from a discovery dispute between plaintiff Motorola Solutions, Inc., and defendants Zurich Insurance Company (Zurich) and Associated Indemnity Corporation (Associated) concerning the production of documents that plaintiff claims are privileged. The parties are engaged in insurance coverage litigation, stemming from several underlying personal injury actions in which claims were asserted against plaintiff. As part of discovery, defendants sought the production of several documents that plaintiff claimed were privileged. The trial court ordered plaintiff to turn over the documents, and plaintiff refused. The trial court then held plaintiff in friendly civil contempt to permit plaintiff to appeal. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s order requiring production of the documents and vacate the friendly contempt order.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 150085 People
v. Bensen Filed 8-7-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Beverly Bensen,1 appeals her conviction of aggravated identity theft (720 ILCS 5/16-30(b)(1) (West 2012)), following a jury trial in the circuit court of Lake County. Defendant was also convicted of one count of theft (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2012)) and two counts of financial exploitation of an elderly person (720 ILCS 5/17-56(a) (West 2012)). Those convictions were merged with the aggravated-identity-theft conviction. We reverse the conviction of aggravated identity theft and remand with instructions to reinstate the convictions of theft and financial exploitation of an elderly person and to sentence defendant on those convictions.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153074 Board
of Trustees of the City of Harvey Firefighters’ Pension
Fund v. City of Harvey Filed 8-4-17 (TJJ)
Defendant City of Harvey (Harvey) is a municipality with a population of approximately 25,000 residents, located south of the city of Chicago. Plaintiff, the Board of Trustees of the City of Harvey Firefighters’ Pension Fund (Pension Board), is an administrative body created pursuant to section 4-121 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/4-121 (West 2014)) to oversee and manage the City of Harvey Firefighters’ Pension Fund (Pension Fund). 40 ILCS 5/4-120 to 4-129 (West 2014). The Pension Board filed suit, alleging that Harvey has underfunded the Pension Fund and breached a 1996 settlement agreement in which Harvey agreed to make certain contributions to the Pension Fund. The trial court found that Harvey violated the pension
statute but was not on the verge of default or imminent bankruptcy. The trial court denied Harvey’s motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to this ruling, the trial court assessed damages against Harvey for $15,071,089.15. The injunction that was issued required Harvey to approve a line-item property tax levy specifically for the Pension Fund, which would be sufficient to meet the annual actuarial requirements set forth in the Code. Harvey filed a notice of appeal, and the Pension Board filed a notice of cross-appeal.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161048 C.O.A.L.,
Inc. v. Dana Hotel, LLC Filed 8-4-17 (TJJ)
The instant appeal arises from the trial court’s section 2-615 dismissal of the complaint filed by plaintiff C.O.A.L., Inc., regarding the termination of the restaurant manager-owner relationship between plaintiff and defendant Dana Hotel, LLC. The trial court dismissed count I of plaintiff’s complaint because it found that the agreement relied on by plaintiff had been superseded by a later agreement and dismissed count III because it found that plaintiff’s claims that defendant had breached its fiduciary duty had been released. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of both counts and, for the reasons that follow, we reverse.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 163313 Sandler
v. Sweet Filed 8-4-17 (TJJ)
The plaintiff, Philip W. Sandler, brought this action against the defendants, Jerry J. Sweet, Ph.D, North Shore Medical Group, and North Shore University Health System, alleging medical negligence, common law fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that no physician-patient relationship existed and, therefore, no duty of care was owed to the plaintiff. The court subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 150463 People
v. Morgan Filed 8-4-17 (TJJ)
After a jury trial, defendant, Keenan Morgan, was found guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2014)) and sentenced to seven years in prison. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, and defendant timely appeals. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court adequately inquired into defendant’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, we remand.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160381 St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. City of Waukegan
Filed 8-1-17 (TJJ)
Defendants, the City of Waukegan and former Waukegan police officers Lucian Tessmann, Donald Meadie, Fernando Shipley, Richard Davis, Terry House, Robert Repp, Burton Setterlund, and Phillip Stevenson and Maria LaCour (as representatives of deceased Waukegan police officers Dennis Cobb and Howard Pratt) (collectively, the City), appeal from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and Travelers Indemnity Company (collectively, the insurers) and denying the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 106527 Beaman
v. Freesmeyer Filed 8-4-17 (TJJ)
In 2008, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned plaintiff’s conviction for the murder of his ex-girlfriend, Jennifer Lockmiller, upon concluding the State violated his right to due process when it failed to disclose material and exculpatory information about an alternative suspect. People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 890 N.E.2d 500 (2008). In April 2014, plaintiff initiated this action, alleging defendants, Tim Freesmeyer, Dave Warner, and Frank Zayas, former officers with the Normal police department, acted maliciously in investigating him and aiding in his prosecution. Against these individual defendants, plaintiff asserted claims of malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy. Plaintiff requested damages from defendant, the Town of Normal, on theories of respondeat superior and indemnification. In June 2016, the trial court, finding no genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff’s claims of malicious prosecution, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals, arguing, in part, a reasonable jury could find in his favor on each of the elements of his malicious-prosecution claim. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 160357 In
re Tara S. Filed 8-3-17 (TJJ)
Respondent, Tara S., appeals from the circuit court’s orders for involuntary admission and administration of psychotropic medication. Respondent argues that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel and this issue is subject to review under the capable of repetition yet avoiding review exception to the mootness doctrine. We reverse the court’s orders for involuntary admission to a mental health facility and involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160483 In
re Application of the County Collector Filed
This appeal involves two tax purchasers, the petitioners, Joseph Bittorf and Janson Investment Company (Janson). Their tax purchases were declared to be sales in error and the petitioners were thus entitled to refunds (35 ILCS 200/21-310 (West 2014)). The respondent, the De Kalb County Collector (Collector), filed motions for the circuit court of De Kalb County to determine how the refunds at issue would be paid. In each case, the trial court determined that the refund should be paid from the tax revenue collected for special service areas (SSAs) that had expired. The petitioners appeal from these orders, and their appeals were consolidated. The petitioners argue that they will never receive their refunds, because the expired SSAs are no longer generating tax revenue. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
No. 2017 IL 122271 Round
v. Lamb Filed 8-3-17 (TJJ)
Petitioner was charged with six counts of violating an order of protection (720 ILCS 5/12-3.4(a) (West 2012) and two related counts of witness harassment (720 ILCS 5/32-4a(a)(2) (West 2012)). On July 2, 2013, he pleaded guilty to two charges with the understanding that the other charges would be dropped and his sentences would be served concurrently. On count I, harassment of a witness, a Class 2 felony, he was sentenced to five years in prison to be followed by two years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). On count III, violation of an order of protection, a Class 4 felony, he was sentenced to three years in prison. By statute, a sentence for violating an order of protection includes a four-year MSR term. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(6) (West 2016). However, no term of MSR connected to that conviction was mentioned during plea negotiations, during the sentencing hearing, or in the written sentencing order. Habeas corpus, mandamus denied.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143741 People v. Rosado Filed 8-1-2017 (ATH)
Before this case was tried, a jury acquitted Joe Rosado of delivering, on March 29, 2011, a controlled substance to an undercover police investigator. After the acquittal, before a different jury but the same judge, Rosado was tried in this case for delivering a controlled substance to the same undercover police investigator on March 23, six days before March 29. The State was allowed to present testimony that Rosado had sold drugs on March 29; however, Rosado was not allowed to tell the jury of his acquittal. On appeal, Rosado challenges both evidentiary rulings.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150836 People v. Zareski Filed 8-1-2017 (ATH)
Brandon Zareski was convicted of first degree murder for shooting Jonathan Nieves. Zareski hired his own counsel, Scott Frankel, to represent him on direct appeal, and we upheld his conviction. Zareski again retained Frankel to file a postconviction petition, which the trial court dismissed at the second stage of proceedings. Zareski now appeals from that dismissal.
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 130220 People v. Branch Filed 8-1-2017 (ATH)
Defendant, James R. Branch, was convicted after a jury trial of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively. Defendant argues on appeal that the State failed to prove him guilty of one count of predatory criminal sexual assault in that there was no evidence of digital penetration. He also asserts he was denied a fair trial because of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. He further contends he is entitled to a Krankel hearing because he alleged in his prepared statement in allocution that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel, but the court made no inquiry into the allegations. Defendant also argues that the court erred in failing to suppress a statement he allegedly made to a detective upon being advised he was under arrest.
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 160199 Jones v. State of Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board Filed 8-1-2017 (ATH)
This appeal involves the tax status of a manufactured home installed months before the effective date of a change in the applicable law. Prior to January 1, 2011, mobile homes and manufactured homes were taxed as real property only if they were resting on a permanent foundation. Under current law, all mobile homes and manufactured homes located outside of mobile home parks are taxed as real property. The law contains a “grandfather clause,” which provides that mobile homes and manufactured homes that were taxed as personal property on the effective date of the amendment will continue to be taxed as personal property until they are sold or transferred or moved to a different location outside of a mobile home park. At issue is the applicability of this provision to a manufactured home that was installed before the effective date of the new law but was not assessed or taxed either as real property or as personal property in 2010.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143718 People v. Jones Filed 7-31-2017 (AMT)
Following a bench trial, defendant Kevin Jones was convicted of failing to register weekly to the Robbins police department in violation of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). The trial court sentenced him to 3 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that he was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to SORA and that he lacked a fixed place of residence. Reversed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160860 Plowman v. Department of Children & Family Services Filed 7-28-2017 (AMT)
The plaintiff, Michael
Plowman, appeals from an order of the circuit court that
affirmed a final administrative decision of the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
denying his request to expunge an indicated finding of
neglect that was entered against him pursuant to the
Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (Reporting
Act). On appeal, he contends that (1) DCFS exceeded its
rulemaking authority in promulgating the regulation upon
which its indicated finding of neglect was based, (2)
the findings of the administrative law judge (ALJ) were
against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (3) the
ALJ's determination that he was neglectful was clearly
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160937 Signapori v. Jagaria Filed 7-28-2017 (AMT)
The plaintiffs, Richard
Singapori and Eshaan Hospitality, Inc. (Eshaan), filed
the instant action against the defendants, Jignesh
Jagaria and Novak Hospitality, Inc. (Novak), alleging
breach of a confidentiality provision contained in an
“Agreement” between the parties. The circuit court granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the
confidentiality provision at issue was void and
unenforceable as a matter of public policy because its
sole purpose was to conceal the parties’
misrepresentations to third-party financial
institutions. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the
court erred in determining that the confidentiality
provision is contrary to public policy because
allegations of the amended complaint do not establish
that the parties violated federal bank fraud laws.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150807 Enbridge Pipeline, LLC v. Monarch Farms, LLC Filed 7-28-2017 (AMT)
In April 2014, the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) granted plaintiff, Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC, now known as the Illinois Extension Pipeline Company (IEPC), eminent-domain authority to acquire easements over certain real estate for the planned construction of an approximately 170-mile liquid petroleum (oil) pipeline project known as the Southern Access Extension (SAX). During the months of June and July 2014, IEPC filed separate complaints for “condemnation of permanent and temporary easements for common-carrier pipeline” (condemnation complaints) against multiple defendants: IEPC’s condemnation complaints sought (1) right-of-way and easement interests in landowners’ respective properties and (2) determinations as to just compensation IEPC owed to landowners for its property interests. In response, each landowner filed a “traverse and motion to dismiss” (traverse motions), seeking dismissal of IEPC’s condemnation complaints. The trial court denied landowners’ traverse motions. Landowners appeal, raising numerous claims that challenge the trial court’s rulings.
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 140493 People v. Frazier Filed 7-28-2017 (AMT)
After a bench trial in the circuit court of Marion County, defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault based upon a position of trust, supervision, or authority and sentenced to four years in the Department of Corrections to be followed by three years to life of mandatory supervised release. She was also fined and assessed fees and costs totaling $597. The two issues raised in this direct appeal are (1) whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss mid-trial on the basis that the information did not state an offense and (2) whether the trial court correctly imposed $597 in fines, fees, and costs. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150085 People v.
Warren Filed 7-26-2017 (AMT)
No. 2017 IL App (3d)
Warren Filed 7-26-2017 (AMT)
No. 2017 IL App (3d)
Warren Filed 7-26-2017 (AMT)
Following his conviction for unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver, defendant, filed a notice of appeal on January 27, 2015. The notice of appeal identified the judgment order entered on January 27, 2015, as the only order subject to defendant’s notice of appeal. On March 27, 2015, the circuit clerk prepared a written summary of the monetary consequences resulting from defendant’s conviction. In this appeal, defendant requests our court to review and vacate portions of the circuit clerk’s data entries placed in the record on March 27, 2015 which was entered subsequent to the notice of appeal filed in this case. Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161023 Myrick
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. Filed 7-25-17
Plaintiff, an employee of Union Pacific Railroad Company, sustained injuries to his leg while he was assigned to work in a rail yard operated by Belt Railway Company of Chicago. Plaintiff alleged that he was dropped off by a Belt Railway employee at an unlit, hazardous location, and that while he was walking from the drop off location to his destination, he stepped in a snow-covered hole. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint asserted claims against Union Pacific and Belt Railway under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012)) and a negligence claim against Belt Railway. Lawanda Myrick, Myrick’s wife, asserted a loss of consortium claim against Belt Railway. The circuit court granted defendants’ pretrial motion in limine to bar plaintiff from introducing evidence that there were safer alternative locations where he could have been dropped off. Plaintiff made an offer of proof regarding the alternative drop off locations. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was denied, and plaintiff appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161943 National
Life Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Scarlato
Filed 7-24-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, National Life Real Estate Holdings, LLC (National Life), appeals the trial court’s ruling that denied its motion for entry of judgment against third-party citation respondent, International Bank of Chicago (IBC), arguing that the court’s decision was improper where after being served with a citation, IBC violated the restraining provision of the citation by extending a loan to judgment debtor, Ronald S. Scarlato. National Life specifically asserts that the citationwas violated when IBC advanced and disbursed proceeds of the loan to third-parties on behalf of Scarlato. IBC responds that the trial court was correct in denying the motion for entry of judgment because National Life has not and cannot establish that IBC ever held property “belonging to the judgment debtor or to which he or she may be entitled or which may thereafter be acquired by or become due to him or her.” See 735 ILCS 5/2-1402(f)(1) (West 2012). We reverse the trial court’s decision to deny National Life’s motion for entry of judgment.
No. 2017 IL 120407 People
v. Holmes Filed 7-20-17 (TJJ)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 142130 People
v. Daniels Filed 7-21-17 (TJJ)
Defendant Ronald Daniels appeals from the order of the circuit court of Cook County denying his petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure to vacate his conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. In a June 2016 opinion, this court vacated the defendant’s conviction, and determined that we lacked jurisdiction to grant the State’s request (raised for the first time on appeal) to reinstate charges that were nol-prossed at the time of defendant’s plea agreement. The supreme court subsequently directed us to consider the effect of People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, as to whether there is appellate jurisdiction to consider the reinstatement of the nol-prossed counts, and, if so, whether those counts can be reinstated. We reverse the denial of defendant’s section 2-1401 petition and vacate his conviction, but we conclude we lack jurisdiction to determine whether the nol-prossed counts may be reinstated.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160583 In
re Marriage of Bernay Filed 7-19-17 (TJJ)
Petitioner, Lynn D. Bernay, appeals from the judgment of the trial court that terminated monthly maintenance payments from Lynn’s former husband, respondent, Jerry S. Bernay. We reverse and remand.
No. 2017 IL App (3rd) 150074 People v. Lobdell Filed 07-19-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (3rd) 150434
City Promotions, LLC v. Illinois Gaming Board
Filed 07-19-17 (MGB)
Gaming Board issued a statement on its website asserting a position that certain Sweepstakes Kiosks were gambling devices subject to the Video Gaming Act. It then cause certain of those devices to be seized. Owners of the devices and their software, sued in replevin and for an injunction to preclude the Board from issuing such pronouncements. Trial court concluded, on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, that the Court Lacked the authority to direct the Board concerning what it could and not publish on its website, and that the Board lacked the power to seize the devices.. ursuant to the foregoing authority and analysis, we hold that the Gaming Board had authority to issue an interpretive rule and to post it but that, because it failed to follow the appropriate rulemaking procedures, the attempted rule is invalid. To the extent that the circuit court made a contrary finding, its judgment is reversed. The circuit court erred when it ruled that the Gaming Board lacked the authority to conduct the seizure of the Kiosks. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is reversed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162140 Schultze v. ABN AMRO, Inc. Filed 07-18-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161278 Baumrucker v. Express Cab Dispatch, Inc. Filed 07-18-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (3rd) 170144 In re B.G. Filed 07-18-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (3rd) 150321 People v. Richey Filed 07-18-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161278 Baumrucker v. Express Cab Dispatch, Inc. Filed 07-18-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162388 Doe v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago Filed 07-17-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160683 Adwent
v. Novak Filed 07-17-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162388 Doe v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago Filed 07-14-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150442 People
v. Avelar Filed 7-12-17 (TJJ)
In January 2015, the State charged defendant, Luis H. Avelar, with three counts of violation of an order of protection. The order of protection at issue prohibited defendant from being within 200 feet of his ex-girlfriend, L.H., and their children, E.A., P.A., and O.A. At the March 2015 jury trial, the evidence showed that defendant picked up two of his children from L.H.’s home in Watseka and took them to Hoopeston, where defendant lived. Defendant then called L.H. and told her that he and the children were at the McDonald’s in Hoopeston. When L.H. went to McDonald’s to pick up the kids, she and defendant argued. Police later arrested defendant for violating the order of protection. The jury found defendant guilty of all three counts of violating the order of protection. The trial court later sentenced defendant to two years’ probation. On appeal, defendant argues that two of his convictions for violation of an order of protection must be vacated because they violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine. We disagree and affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160309 Fillmore
v. Taylor Filed 7-12-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Aaron Fillmore, who is in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (Department), sued three officers of the Department, Gladyse C. Taylor, Leif M. McCarthy, and Eldon L. Cooper, for failing to follow mandatory legal procedures before imposing discipline upon him for violating prison rules. He sought a writ of mandamus, declaratory relief, and a common-law writ of certiorari. The trial court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff appeals. In our de novo review, we agree with the trial court that the count for declaratory judgment, count II, is legally insufficient in its entirety. We disagree, however, that the remaining two counts are legally insufficient in their entirety. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse it in part, and we remand this case for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161019 King
Koil Licensing Co. v. Harris Filed 7-11-17
Plaintiff, King Koil Licensing Company (King Koil), appeals a jury’s verdict in favor of defendants, Roger B. Harris and Fox, Hefter, Swibel, Levin & Carroll, LLP (Fox Hefter), in King Koil’s legal malpractice action. King Koil alleged that Harris negligently drafted a licensing agreement with King Koil’s long-term licensee, Blue Bell Mattress Company (Blue Bell), causing a significant loss in revenue. The case proceeded to a jury trial in October 2015, resulting in a verdict in favor of Harris and Fox Hefter. On appeal, King Koil contends that the court erred in barring the introduction of certain evidence at trial and refusing to order Harris to produce specific documents in discovery. King Koil further challenges the court’s decision to allow Harris to propound special interrogatories to the jury. Finally, King Koil maintains that the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find no merit in any of King Koil’s arguments and affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161131 231
W. Scott v. Lakeside Bank Filed 7-11-17 (TJJ)
Following a bench trial in Cook County circuit court, the trial court entered judgment against defendant Greater Illinois Title Company (GIT) and in favor of plaintiff 231 W. Scott, LLC (LLC), concluding that GIT had breached its fiduciary duty as construction escrowee to the LLC. According to the trial court, given the number of problems in the construction process, GIT owed a duty to the LLC to, at a minimum, inquire into the problems and, if warranted, investigate further, including conducting an “informal viewing” of the construction project. On appeal, GIT argues (1) that the trial court erred in concluding that GIT’s fiduciary responsibilities to the LLC included the duty to investigate construction problems before disbursing payments and (2) even if GIT did breach its fiduciary duties to the LLC, that breach was not the proximate cause of the LLC’s damages. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment against GIT.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160347 Service
Employees International Union v. Illinois Labor
Relations Board Filed 6-30-17 (TJJ)
Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 and section 9(i) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, petitioner, Service Employees International Union, Local 73 (Union), seeks direct review of a decision of respondent, the Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel (Board), finding employees under the jurisdiction of respondent, the Illinois Secretary of State (Secretary), titled Executive I, Executive II, Drivers Facility Manager I (DFM I), and Drivers Facility Manager II (DFM II), were not public employees within the meaning of section 3(n) of the Labor Act. On review, the Union (1) challenges the Board’s interpretation of section 3(n) of the Labor Act and (2) argues the Executive I, Executive II, DFM I, and DFM II positions did not meet the requirements for exclusion under section 3(n) of the Labor Act. We confirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161334 Thounsavath
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Filed 6-30-17 (TJJ)
The plaintiff, Phoungeun Thounsavath, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The plaintiff sought a declaration that, as applied to her, the driver exclusion endorsement in the automobile liability policies issued to her by State Farm violated section 143a-2 of the Illinois Insurance Code and the public policy of Illinois. State Farm answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff was not entitled to underinsured coverage under her automobile liability policies with State Farm. The circuit court denied State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. State Farm appeals.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160493 People
v. Fricks Filed 7-6-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Leonard R. Fricks, entered a nonnegotiated plea of guilty to a single count of first-degree murder and was sentenced to a 60-year prison term (which included a 20-year sentencing enhancement for personally discharging a firearm during the commission of the offense. Prior to sentencing, defendant unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his guilty plea, contending, inter alia, that his attorney, Wendell Coates, had made false assurances about the length of the sentence defendant would receive. After the trial court imposed sentence, Phillips filed a motion to reduce defendant’s sentence. The trial court denied the motion and defendant appealed. Because defendat's attorney did not properly certify compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d), we vacated the denial of the motion and remanded the matter for proceedings in compliance with that rule. People v. Fricks, No. 2-14-0054 (Aug. 11, 2014) (minute order). On remand, defendant was represented by attorney Gary V. Pumilia, who filed a second amended motion to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea, along with a proper certificate under the amended Rule 604(d). The trial court denied that motion. Pumilia also advised the trial court that defendant was “standing on and adopting” his prior motion to reduce his sentence. When Pumilia informed the trial court that it had previously ruled on the motion to reduce defendant’s sentence, the trial court stated, “So that ruling will stand.” Pumilia did not ask to be heard on, and there were no further proceedings relative to, the motion to reduce defendant’s sentence. This appeal followed. Because there was no hearing on remand on the motion to reduce defendant’s sentence, yet another remand is necessary.
No. 2017 ILApp (3d) 1660102 Chiurato
v. Dayton Estates Dam & Water Co. Filed
Plaintiffs John Chiurato, Dennis Corbin, and Michele Cioni are homeowners in a residential community known as Dayton Estates. Defendant, Dayton Estates Dam & Water Company, is a not-for-profit corporation created in part for the purpose of maintaining a dam and lake that previously existed in the subdivision. In August 2007, the dam failed, and the lake emptied. Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment and alleging breach of contract against the company and the members of the board for failing to rebuild the dam. Defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that Dayton Estates Dam & Water Company is not a homeowners association operating a common interest community under section 9-102(c) of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act and moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim against the company. The individual board members also filed motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the breach of contract claims. The trial court granted summary judgment on the declaratory judgment counts and dismissed plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims against the company and the individual board members with prejudice. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160601 Pekin
Insurance Co. v. Johnson-Downs Construction Inc.
Filed 7-6-17 (TJJ)
Defendant Johnson-Downs Construction, Inc. (Johnson-Downs), entered into a construction contract with Art’s Landscaping, Inc. (Art’s). Jeff Barnett, an Art’s employee, was injured at the site and sued Johnson-Downs for construction negligence. Pekin Insurance Company (Pekin) filed a declaratory judgment action in Will County circuit court claiming it did not have a duty to defend Johnson-Downs as an additional insured under Art’s insurance policy. Johnson-Downs filed a motion to stay the action pending the resolution of the underlying case, which the trial court granted. Pekin appeals, arguing (1) the trial court’s grant of the motion to stay was an abuse of discretion, (2) the trial court cannot consider Johnson-Downs’s third amended complaint in its determination, and (3) the trial court cannot consider Barnett’s amended complaint in its determination. We reverse and remand with directions.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150342 Enbridge
Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Kiefer Filed
In April 2014, the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) granted plaintiff, Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC, now known as the Illinois Extension Pipeline Company, LLC (IEPC), eminent-domain authority to acquire easements over certain real estate for the planned construction of an approximately 170-mile liquid petroleum (oil) pipeline known as the Southern Access Extension (SAX project). Landowners appeal, raising numerous claims that challenge the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment in IEPC’s favor. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150346 Enbridge
Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Temple Filed
In April 2014, the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) granted plaintiff, Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC, now known as the Illinois Extension Pipeline Company, LLC (IEPC), eminent-domain authority to acquire easements over certain real estate for the planned construction of an approximately 170-mile liquid petroleum (oil) pipeline known as the Southern Access Extension (SAX project). During June and July 2014, IEPC filed separate complaints for “condemnation of permanent and temporary easements for common-carrier pipeline” (condemnation complaints) against numerous landowners. Following a March 2015 hearing, the trial court granted IEPC’s summary judgment motion and awarded just compensation totaling $45,000 (Temple $1000; Adreon $21,000; and JPR $23,000). Landowners appeal, raising numerous claims that challenge the trial court’s rulings. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court’s denial of landowners’ traverse motions and remand with directions for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150544 Enbridge
Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hoke Filed 7-6-17
In April 2014, the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) granted plaintiff, Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC, now known as the Illinois Extension Pipeline Company (IEPC), eminent-domain authority to acquire easements over certain real estate for the planned construction of an approximately 170-mile liquid petroleum (oil) pipeline known as the Southern Access Extension (SAX project). Landowners appeal, raising numerous claims that challenge the trial court’s rulings. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the trial court’s denial of landowners’ traverse motions and remand with directions for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160552 Turner
v. Orthopedic and Shoulder Center, S.C. Filed
Plaintiff, Cassandra Turner, brought this action against defendant, Orthopedic and Shoulder Center, S.C., for consumer fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Both theories were premised on defendant’s charging her more for medical services than the amounts that defendant had agreed to charge, in its contract with plaintiff’s health insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois (Blue Cross). The allegedly fraudulent charge was in the form of a healthcare services lien that defendant asserted against the settlement proceeds in plaintiff’s personal injury case In our de novo review of the summary judgment, we reach the following conclusions. First, plaintiff has forfeited her theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress because, in her opening brief, she makes no reasoned argument in support of that theory. Second, asserting the health-care services lien was a breach of contract, but it was not consumer fraud. Therefore, we affirm the summary judgment on the two counts of the second amended complaint, but we reverse the denial of plaintiff’s “Petition To Adjudicate Lien to Zero.”
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150764 Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Norris Filed 7-3-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as trustee for a certain specified trust, brought an action against defendant, Arthur Norris, and others seeking to foreclose upon a mortgage held on certain real property in Rock Island County, Illinois. During pretrial proceedings, Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment on the foreclosure complaint. Defendant opposed the motion, claiming, among other things, that Wells Fargo’s foreclosure complaint was barred by the single refiling rule (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 1994)). Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo on the mortgage foreclosure complaint. After defendant’s motion to reconsider was denied, the property was sold at a foreclosure sale, and the sale was confirmed by the trial court. Defendant appeals, challenging the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Wells Fargo. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150642 People
v. Richmond Filed 6-30-17 (TJJ)
A jury found Darnell Richmond guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault, based largely on DNA evidence. Richmond now appeals from the dismissal of his postconviction petition as patently without merit. He argues that his attorney should have sought in discovery the number of nine-locus matches in the Illinois DNA database to challenge the use of the product rule to estimate the probability that a person at random would match the DNA of the sperm found in the victim at the nine loci where Richmond’s DNA matched the sperm. We find that, because a prior analysis of the number of matches actually found in the Illinois database broadly supported the use of the product rule, the failure to request an update of the data in discovery does not show ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the Cook County circuit court’s dismissal of the postconviction petition.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152021 People
v. Williams Filed 6-30-17 (TJJ)
Defendant Otis Williams, who was convicted of murder, presented alibi testimony at his third-stage postconviction evidentiary hearing in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At the close of defendant’s evidence, the State moved for a directed finding, and the circuit court granted that motion. The circuit court found that the alibi witnesses were not credible and defendant thus failed to show trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not interviewing or calling those alibi witnesses. For the following reasons, we hold that the circuit court’s findings about witness credibility and the weight and quality of the evidence were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court that granted the State a directed finding and denied defendant postconviction relief at the third-stage evidentiary hearing.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 153515 McNerney
v. Allamuradov Filed 6-30-17 (TJJ)
After Susanna McNerney (McNerney) contacted 303 Taxi, L.L.C. (303) to arrange transportation, a taxicab marked with 303’s logo, telephone number, and distinctive colors arrived at McNerney’s residence at the designated time. The taxicab driver, Muhtar Allamuradov (Allamuradov), sexually assaulted McNerney as he drove her to the airport. McNerney filed an action in the circuit court of Cook County against (i) Allamuradov, (ii) 303, a taxicab dispatch company, and (iii) Grand Transportation, Inc. (Grand), which had leased the taxicab to Allamuradov. On appeal, McNerney challenges the grant of summary judgment in favor of 303 and Grand. She also contends that the circuit court erred in not permitting her to supplement the record with certain “newly discovered” evidence, including a license application completed by Allamuradov. In separately-filed cross-appeals, Grand and 303 contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the circuit court improperly considered McNerney’s late-filed motion contesting the grant of summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we find that this Court has jurisdiction, and we reverse the decision of the circuit court granting summary judgment and remand this matter for additional proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160756 Marque
Medicos Fullerton, LLC v. Hartford Underwriters
Insurance Co. Filed 6-30-17 (TJJ)
In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs-appellant appeal from the dismissal, with prejudice, of four separate putative class-action lawsuits filed against defendants-appellees. For the following reasons, we conclude that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ claims and that those claims were properly dismissed with prejudice.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161765 Wade
v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. Filed 6-30-17
The instant appeal arises from a breach of contract dispute regarding a title insurance policy for a multiunit residential building in Chicago, Illinois. Plaintiff, Josephine Wade, the purchaser of the property, filed suit against defendant, Stewart Title Guaranty Company, alleging that defendant failed to timely remove defects on the property’s title. Plaintiff claimed that defendant’s delay in curing the title defects resulted in the demolition of the property because plaintiff was unable to obtain a loan to rehabilitate the property to comply with the City of Chicago’s building code. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of defendant, finding that defendant did not breach any duties it owed to plaintiff under the policy. Plaintiff appeals the judgment entered by the trial court. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162033 Catledge
v. Dowling Filed 6-30-17 (TJJ)
Pro se plaintiff, Lee Catledge, filed a complaint in the trial court, seeking administrative review of an order of the acting director of the Illinois Department of Insurance upholding the cancellation of plaintiff’s homeowners insurance policy. Defendants, the Illinois Department of Insurance and Anne Melissa Dowling, its acting director, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, claiming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to review the administrative order, since plaintiff did not first exhaust his administrative remedies where he failed to request rehearing before filing his complaint in the trial court. The trial court granted defendants’ motion, and plaintiff appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162116 James
River Insurance Co. v. TimCal, Inc. Filed
This case involves an insurer's duty to defend or indemnify an insurance agent for negligent placement of insurance coverage that allegedly caused another insurer to incur damages. In July 2012, TimCal, Inc., an insurance agent affiliated with Geico Direct Representatives, received from Fidelity National Property & Casualty Insurance Company a letter, charging TimCal with breach of its duties as an insurance agent and informing TimCal that Fidelity would seek to recover damages. TimCal did not inform its professional liability insurer, James River Insurance Company, about the claim until April 2013. James River filed a complaint against TimCal and Fidelity, seeking a judgment declaring that it had no duty to defend or indemnify TimCal because TimCal failed to provide timely notice of Fidelity’s claim to James River. The circuit court granted James River’s motion for summary judgment. We find no ambiguity in the pertinent policy terms, and the circuit court correctly applied the policy to the facts in this case. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment in favor of James River.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150070 People
v. Lewis Filed 6-29-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Barron Lewis, was found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault in 2010, and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. In this appeal, defendant challenges the summary dismissal of his petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122- 1 et seq. (West 2014)). Defendant maintains that he presented an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to investigate his negative chlamydia test results, and to present that evidence to the trial court in support of his contention that the victim's positive chlamydia test results should have been admitted.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 151998 West
Loop Associates, LLC v. Property Tax Appeal Board
Filed 6-29-17 (TJJ)
Petitioner West Loop Associates, Inc. (West Loop), seeks review of three final administrative decisions by respondent Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) to increase the valuation of commercial property located at 550 West Jackson Boulevard in Chicago from $70.4 million to $73.8 million, rather than reducing it as West Loop sought to $58.0 million. West Loop’s separate actions with PTAB for the tax years 2009, 2010, and 2011 were consolidated into a single administrative hearing, and the three subsequent appeals to this court, Nos. 1-15- 1998, 1-15-1999, and 1-15-2000 have also been consolidated.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 152454 Bangaly
v. Bagianni Filed 6-23-17 (TJJ)
The instant appeal concerns a criminal contempt finding arising out of wrongful death litigation in which the contemnor, Bangaly Sylla,1 was involved as the administrator of the decedent’s estate. In connection with that case, Sylla, as administrator of decedent Hawa Sissoko’s estate, filed an affidavit of heirship averring that Sissoko had never been married and also submitted answers to interrogatories stating the same. However, shortly before trial, the defendants in that action discovered that Sissoko may have, in fact, been married to a New York cabdriver named Noumouke Keita. The trial court appointed a third prosecutor, who proceeded with the contempt process and took the case to trial. After a jury trial, the jury found Sylla to be in indirect criminal contempt. After hearing factors in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). On appeal, Sylla raises a number of issues concerning the propriety of the indirect criminal contempt proceedings. We find that the trial court erred in denying Sylla’s motion for substitution of judge and, accordingly, reverse and remand for a new trial before a different trial judge.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162308 Willis
v. United Equitable Insurance Co. Filed
Defendant, United Equitable Insurance Company (UEIC), appeals the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, Valentina Willis and Kathy Dobson Willis, on their declaratory judgment claim seeking coverage under UEIC’s policy. On appeal, UEIC contends that the court erred in granting summary judgment because the clear terms of the policy require plaintiffs to both unequivocally demand arbitration and appoint an arbitrator within two years of the accident, which plaintiffs did not do. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162356 Underwood
v. City of Chicago Filed 6-29-17 (TJJ)
This case is back before the court following another round of rulings by the circuit court concerning plaintiffs’ rights to healthcare coverage. Plaintiffs are multiple categories of City of Chicago retirees who have participated in the City’s medical benefits plan and received some level of healthcare coverage from the City over the years. The City has undertaken to eliminate the healthcare benefits that many of the plaintiffs previously enjoyed; while the plaintiffs have fought to retain the benefits under a number of legal and equitable principles. The circuit court largely ruled in favor of the City and dismissed most of the plaintiffs’ claims. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 141143 People
v. Nere Filed 6-29-17 (TJJ)
After a jury trial, defendant, Jennifer N. Nere, was convicted of drug-induced homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(a) (West 2012)) and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. On appeal, she argues that (1) the trial court erred in giving several improper jury instructions and refusing other instructions and (2) she was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160037 State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Plough
Filed 6-29-17 (TJJ)
This appeal follows a small-claims subrogation trial and raises questions about the application of the Dead-Man’s Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/8-201 (West 2014)). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160334 People
v. Cole Filed 6-29-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Michael T. Cole, was found guilty of one count of child abduction by a noncustodial parent (720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(3) (West 2014)). He argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he took the child without the mother’s consent. We agree, and thus we reverse his conviction.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160801 Spencer
v. Wayne Filed 6-29-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff, Arlethia Spencer, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Lake County against Mona Strenger, seeking recovery for personal injuries that plaintiff suffered when she allegedly slipped on a mat and fell while exiting a vehicle in defendant’s garage. Strenger died during the pendency of the lawsuit, and the trial court appointed defendant, Gail Strenger Wayne, as her special representative. Wayne successfully moved for summary judgment, contending that plaintiff could not establish Strenger’s negligence without testimony that would be inadmissible under the Dead-Man’s Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/8-201 (West 2014)) at trial. Following the denial of her motion for reconsideration, plaintiff timely appeals, arguing that the trial court misapplied the Act. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 140921 People
v. Brown Filed 6-29-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Ray A. Brown, Jr., appeals following his conviction for domestic battery. He argues that his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance when she requested a jury instruction on self-defense but presented in closing argument a theory of the case inconsistent with such an instruction. Alternatively, defendant argues that counsel was constitutionally ineffective in that she proceeded under an actual conflict of interest in posttrial proceedings, where the only issue she raised was her own ineffectiveness at trial. Finally, defendant contends that a number of monetary assessments were imposed by the circuit clerk without authority, and he requests that this court vacate those assessments. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with instructions.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150407 People v. Merriweather Filed 6-29-17 (TJJ)
In February 2006, a jury found defendant, Byron J. Merriweather, guilty of first degree murder. In May 2006, the trial court sentenced him to 70 years in prison. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction. In December 2008, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which the trial court dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit. This court affirmed. In February 2013, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, which the trial court denied in March 2015. On appeal, defendant argues (1) this court should vacate his de facto life sentence and remand for resentencing and (2) the trial court erred in denying him leave to file a successive postconviction petition. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand with directions.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160347
Employees International Union v. The Illinois Labor
Relations Board Filed 6-28-17 (MGB)
This matter concerns consolidated Petitions by the Union and the Secretary of State seeking to clarify whether the above noted employees are public employees, and thus members of the Collective Bargaining Unit. The Administrative Law Judge found that they were not in her recommended Order and the Labor Relations Board agreed. The Statute (amended during the pendency of the Unions initial Peitition) specifically excludes Executives I and higher, and the the DFM's are excluded as a person whose position authorizes direct or indirect input into government decision-making issues where there is room for principled disagreement on goals or their implementation.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 150407
v. Merriweather Filed 6-28-17 (MGB)
A jury found defendant, Byron J. Merriweather, who was 17 at the time of the crime, guilty of first degree murder and the trial court sentenced him to 70 years in prison. On direct appeal, this court affirmed his conviction. In December 2008, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, which the trial court dismissed as frivolous and patently without merit. This court affirmed. In February 2013, defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, which the trial court denied in March 2015. Defendant's Pro se petition alleged new evidence of innocence. On Appeal from the denial, he also raised the issue that his 70 year sentence was a de facto license and the statute under which he was sentenced was unconstitutional as applied. Our Supreme Court has found the unconstitutional as applied rule regarding youthful offenders promulgated by Millerv v Alabama was a new substantive rule for which defendants whose convictions or final may seek to benefit off through appropriate collateral proceedings. In this case, that appropriate collateral proceeding is a successive postconviction petition. Thus, to raise his claim through a successive postconviction petition, defendant must obtain leave from the trial court. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016). We note the arguments defendant has advanced for the first time on appeal may well convince the trial court to grant defendant such leave. A successive postconviction petition may only be filed if leave of court is granted.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160889 In re Estate of Scherr Filed 06-28-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 140956 People v. Schutz Filed 06-07-17 (MGB)
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 142879 People
v. Jackson Filed 6-27-17 (TJJ)
After James Jackson calls 911 for an ambulance, the paramedics arrive to find him “agitated,” “nervous,” “irrational,” and “very uncooperative,” suffering from some type of psychological issue and with an “altered” mental state. The paramedics call for police assistance. Jackson screams and flails; one officer uses his taser on Jackson, striking him 10 times. Another officer tries to grab Jackson and gets kicked in the shins. Jackson resists being placed in handcuffs. Ultimately, the police subdue him and place him into the ambulance for transport to the hospital. Jackson is charged and convicted of battery and resisting arrest. Reversed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143274 People
v. Grigorov Filed 6-27-17 (TJJ)
Pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, defendant George Grigorov1 was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (ADUI) and driving on a revoked or suspended license. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of six and three years with fines and fees. Grigorov now appeals from an order denying his petition for revocation of fines based upon his alleged inability to pay. On appeal, he has abandoned his claim regarding inability to pay, but he contends for the first time that he should receive presentencing detention credit against his fines and that certain of his fines and fees were erroneously assessed. For the reasons stated below, we grant the requested presentencing detention credit, but find that we lack jurisdiction over Grigorov’s other newly raised claims and therefore affirm the denial of his petition.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143779 People
v. Miller Filed 6-27-17 (TJJ)
Defendant Melvin Miller was convicted by a jury of delivery of a controlled substance and sentenced to 12 years’ incarceration. He argues on appeal that (i) the trial court failed to “conduct a meaningful inquiry” after a juror equivocated while answering a question posed during the jury polling after the guilty verdict, (ii) the prosecution failed to tender Miller’s statement to police officers giving his name and date of birth, and (iii) the trial court erroneously refused his tendered jury instruction regarding prior inconsistent statements. Miller requests reversal of his conviction based on each of these alleged errors. Affirmed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 143800 People
v. Griffin Filed 6-27-17 (TJJ)
Pursuant to 2014 guilty pleas, defendant Joseph Griffin was convicted of burglary (in case No. 13 CR 12564) and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (in case No. 12 CR 13428) and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of six and five years, respectively, with fines and fees. More than 30 days after sentencing in both cases, Griffin filed a pro se motion to correct the mittimus to reflect a different custody date for purposes of calculating presentence detention credit. On appeal from the denial of that motion, Griffin abandoned his claim regarding the date he was taken into custody but contends for the first time that certain fines and fees were erroneously assessed and that he is entitled to presentencing detention credit against his remaining assessments. We find that we may not reach the merits of his claims, since Griffin failed to file a motion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) within 30 days of sentencing and, in any event, the trial court’s denial of his motion was not a final and appealable order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150091 People
v. Evans Filed 6-27-17 (TJJ)
After a bench trial, defendant Keywani Evans was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Evans appeals his conviction, arguing that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court asked the State to present more evidence after it had rested both its case-in-chief and its rebuttal case. In affirming the judgment of the trial court, we hold that the trial court did not abandon its role as neutral arbiter and assume the role of prosecutor by requesting to see evidence that the State did not produce in its case-in-chief.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 140917 People
v. Kent Filed 6-27-17 (TJJ)
In the direct appeal of his first-degree murder conviction, defendant, Lorenzo Kent, Jr., argues that (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, because the State’s witnesses were not credible; (2) the trial court erred in admitting a Facebook post without sufficient authentication; and (3) the court erred in admitting the unauthenticated, computergenerated records of a phone allegedly used by defendant and in allowing the State to use inadmissible hearsay evidence of the victim’s phone number to show that defendant called him repeatedly on the date of the offense. We reverse and remand.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160737 In
re Marriage of Ruvola Filed 6-27-17 (TJJ)
Petitioner, Leonard A. Ruvola, raises various challenges to the trial court’s judgment dissolving his marriage to respondent, Michelle Ruvola. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
No. 2017 IL App (3d) 150157 Barnes
v. Lolling Filed 6-27-17 (TJJ)
Plaintiff Jerry L. Barnes, a former bankruptcy debtor, sued defendants Daniel R. Lolling (Lolling) and his employer, United Contractors Midwest, Inc. (United Contractors), for personal injuries Barnes allegedly sustained during an automobile accident. The accident took place on October 7, 2011, after Barnes had filed her Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and while the bankruptcy proceeding was pending. Barnes did not disclose her potential cause of action against the defendants to the bankruptcy trustee or schedule the cause of action as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. Barnes filed the instant personal injury claim on October 7, 2013, two years after the accident and approximately five months after the bankruptcy court had discharged Barnes’s debts and closed the bankruptcy case. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) Barnes’s personal injury claim was barred under the doctrine of judicial estoppel because Barnes failed to disclose the claim during the bankruptcy proceedings; and (2) Barnes lacked standing to sue because the personal injury action accrued while the bankruptcy case was pending and was therefore the property of the bankruptcy estate. The trial court ruled that the elements of judicial estoppel had been met and granted summary judgment for the defendants on that basis. This appeal followed.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 160195 Madison
v. The City of Chicago Filed 6-26-17 (TJJ)
We are asked in this appeal to consider whether the one-year limitations period in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2010)) bars the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful demolition. We hold that it does not and reverse the trial court’s dismissal of that claim on statute of limitations grounds. We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s other claims.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 162320 LePretre
v. Lend Lease Construction, Inc. Filed 6-26-17
Plaintiff William M. LePretre brought a cause of action against Lend Lease (US) Construction, Inc. (Lend Lease) and other defendants for injuries he allegedly sustained while working at a construction site at 515 North Clark Street in Chicago. Lend Lease filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted it, finding that Lend Lease owed no duty to plaintiff under which it could be subject to vicarious or direct liability. The trial court also denied plaintiff’s motion to reconsider, and plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (5th) 140427 People
v. Etherton Filed 6-26-17 (TJJ)
Defendant, Randy Etherton, appeals from a final judgment of conviction of a single count of residential burglary, a Class 1 felony. He was sentenced as a Class X offender due to his prior criminal convictions, which carries a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years. Defendant was sentenced to 20 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections and was ordered to serve 3 years mandatory supervised release.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 150355 People
v. Schlosser Filed 6-23-17 (TJJ)
Defendant John Schlosser was convicted, after a bench trial, of involuntary manslaughter, two counts of aggravated battery and two counts of home invasion and sentenced to a total of 22 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). On direct appeal, this court vacated his convictions for involuntary manslaughter, as well as one count of aggravated battery and one count of home invasion, but affirmed his remaining convictions. People v. Schlosser, No. 1-06-1832 (2007) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Since the vacated sentences ran concurrently to sentence which were affirmed, the aggregate sentence did not change and appellate counsel did not seek a remand for resentencing. On appeal from the second-stage dismissal, this court found that postconviction counsel’s performance was unreasonable and failed to comply with the duties imposed by Rule 651(c). People v. Schlosser, 2012 IL App (1st) 092523, ¶ 26. On remand, the trial court appointed the same counsel to represent defendant, and the trial court dismissed the petition again at the second stage. On appeal, defendant argues that he is entitled to have his case remanded for the appointment of new postconviction counsel, since he was represented on remand by the same counsel whose representation was already deemed unreasonable in this case. For the following reasons, we agree and we remand to allow the appointment of new counsel and further second-stage consideration.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 161466 Deutsche
Bank National Trust v. Peters Filed 6-23-17
Following a judgment of foreclosure on the property formerly owned by defendant-appellant Rudy Peters, the circuit court of Cook County entered a judgment, confirming the sale of the property in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Deutsche Bank National Trust (the bank). Peters now appeals from the order confirming the sale. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
No. 2017 IL App (1st) 170215 In
re Marriage of Padilla Filed 6-23-17 (TJJ)
The instant appeal arises from the trial court’s continuance of an emergency ex parte order of protection, which awarded petitioner Martha Padilla the physical care and possession of the 12-year-old son of petitioner and respondent Robert Kowalski. The order of protection had been continued a number of times over 10 months, and the trial court order at issue on appeal ordered that respondent’s motion for rehearing on the order of protection would not be heard until certain other pending motions had first been decided. Respondent appeals this order, claiming that it constitutes an improper injunction that deprives him of his due process rights. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s order and order the trial court to hold a hearing on respondent’s motion.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 141241 People
v. Johnson Filed 6-23-17 (TJJ)
Following a bench trial in the Du Page County circuit court, defendant, Calvin Johnson, was convicted of criminal sexual assault, aggravated domestic battery, aggravated battery, and two counts of unlawful restraint. He was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for criminal sexual assault and four concurrent terms of 30 months’ probation, including 160 days in jail, for the other offenses. He appeals, contending that (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court committed plain error by requiring him to submit to a sex-offender evaluation when he was subject to a mandatory prison sentence. We affirm.
No. 2017 IL App (2d) 160743 Nielson
v. SwedishAmerican Hospital Filed 6-23-17
In this interlocutory appeal, defendant, SwedishAmerican Hospital, challenges the trial court’s order finding it in contempt for refusing to produce three quality control reports (QCRs) pertaining to surgery performed on plaintiff Connie F. Nielson. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(5) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) (order finding entity in contempt and imposing monetary penalty is appealable without special finding). Defendant argues that the QCRs are privileged under sections 8-2101 and 8-2102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Medical Studies Act or the Act), because they were submitted to a quality-assurance committee by the committee’s designees, pursuant to the committee’s standing request for such information whenever a defined “medical occurrence” has taken place. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
No. 2017 IL 119484 People
v. Ringland Filed 6-29-17 (TJJ)
Defendants, Cara Ringland, Steven Pirro, James Saxen, Steven Harris, and Matthew Flynn, were separately charged with felony drug offenses in the circuit court of La Salle County. In each case, a controlled substance was discovered during a traffic stop. These traffic stops were conducted by a special investigator appointed by Brian Towne, then State’s Attorney of La Salle County, pursuant to section 3-9005(b) of the Counties Code. The circuit court granted each defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the conduct of the special investigator exceeded the scope of section 3-9005(b). 2015 IL App (3d) 130523. This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015)), and we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
IL App (2d) 160690 Centure Bank v.
Voga Filed 6-22-2017 (ATH)
IL App (2d) 160690 Centure Bank v.
Voga Filed 6-22-2017 (ATH)
Defendant and counterplaintiff, Lyle Voga (Lyle), appeals various rulings of the circuit court of Kendall County in this dispute over a trust established by Lyle’s late father, Leroy Voga (Leroy). Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
No. 2017 IL App (4th)
150847 Carroll v. Community
Health Care Clinic, Inc. Filed 6-22-2017
No. 2017 IL App (4th)
150847 Carroll v. Community
Health Care Clinic, Inc. Filed 6-22-2017
In April 2015, plaintiff, David S. Carroll, filed a medical malpractice complaint against defendants, Community Health Care Clinic, Inc. (Clinic), Paul Pedersen, M.D., and Sue McGinnes, APN. In June 2015, the Clinic filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under section 2-619(a)(9) asserting it was immune from liability. The next month, Dr. Pedersen and McGinnes also filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, alleging they were both immune from liability under section 30 of the Good Samaritan Act and Dr. Pedersen was also immune under section 54.5(e) of the Medical Practice Act. After hearing, the circuit court granted the motions to dismiss with prejudice finding both doctors and the Clinic immune from liability. Plaintiff appeals.
No. 2017 IL App (4th) 160392 Hoffman v. Madigan Filed 6-22-2017In November 2015, plaintiff Tom L. Tyrrell, in his official capacity as Director of Central Management Services (CMS), filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief. Following Tyrrell’s resignation, Michael Hoffman, in his official capacity as Acting Director of CMS, was substituted as plaintiff. The complaint requested (1) defendant, Lisa Madigan, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Illinois, be enjoined from representing CMS before the Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) on cases involving “personal assistants,” based on her refusal to defend CMS’s determination that a personal assistant was not a State employee for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act and (2) a special assistant Attorney General be appointed to represent CMS. This appeal follows the trial court’s granting of the Attorney General’s 2-615 motion to dismiss.